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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Arrow (1963)
1. “the special structural characteristics of the medical care
market are largely attempts to overcome the lack of optimality
due to the non-marketability of the bearing of suitable risks
and the imperfect marketability of information”
⇒ necessity of ‘two-sided’ insurance markets
2. compensatory institutional changes emerge in response to
the non-marketability of bearing suitable risks and imperfect
marketability of information, but these changes may
themselves interfere with optimality
⇒ “the social adjustment towards optimality puts obstacles in its
own path” during contractual/institutional evolution
‘TWO-SIDED MARKETS’ FOR HEALTH CARE
Extrapolation from work of Rochet and Tirole
Two-sided markets
platforms that help parties “get together in many ways and
thereby create value for these parties that they could not
readily obtain without the co-ordination of the platform”
(Evans and Schmalansee, 2005)
Application to health care
Insurance provider at the ‘hub’
risk-bearing (insurance) markets on one side (inputs)
health care service delivery markets on the other side (outputs)
TWO-SIDED HEALTHCARE MARKET
GOVERNMENT AND TWO-SIDED MARKETS
Government as sponsor
structuring coverage,regulating plans, managing enrolment
reallocating premium burden across consumers
‘solidarity contributions’ to effect wealth transfers
Government as insurance hub provider
distinction between of solidarity payments, premium subsidies
Government as health care service provider
distinction between purchasing and provision (the ‘purchaser-
provider split’)
CONTRACTUAL RISK ALLOCATION
Contracts as mechanism to allocate risk
Insurance contracts
specify premium paid and patient co-payments (input side)
specify service provider remuneration terms (output side)
Competition in each of insurance markets, service
provision markets when insurers can set the degree of
consumer cost-sharing optimally can result in a
second-best efficient outcome
(Gaynor, Haas-Wilson and Vogt, 2000)
Evolution: implications for two-sided health care markets
Managed Care as example
PRE-NZPHCS PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
PRE-NZPHCS: KEY FEATURES
Government as sponsor and insurer (risk manager)
Private sector service provision
practitioner charging autonomy (1938 f.f.s. ‘S88’ payments)
no risk bearing associated with patient demand uncertainty
Tightly-targeted insurance market
majority self-insuring
limited risk-sharing (government = residual risk bearer)
taxation ‘solidarity payments’ as principal wealth redistribution
method (ex ante equity adjustments; cost to all taxpayers)
‘S88’ payments = welfare benefit outputs from social insurance
Moral hazard: low
patient ‘co-payments’ cannot be efficient insurance contracts
but limited in application (subsidies = 30% of practitioner income)
Adverse selection: non-existent
NZPHCS: STATED DESIGN (King, 2001)
NZPHCS: KEY DESIGN FEATURES
Substantial increase in government expenditure share
Universal capitation funding
mandatory risk-sharing for registered population
Subsidy becomes premium contribution to private
sector competing insurers (PHOs)
Government ‘risk-free’; private sector become risk managers
PHOs as managed care providers
contracts with insured individuals
no apparent barriers to optimal ex ante contracts, ex post co-payments
contracts with service providers
as agents of insured individuals
ability to design optimal incentive contracts
NZPHCS: IN PRACTICE
TRANSITION IMPLICATIONS
Retention of provider charging autonomy
negates ability to design optimal provider incentive contracts
leads to bundling of ex ante premium contributions and ex post
co-payments into a single ex post payment
Price ‘regulation’ expectations
ex post ‘bundled payments used to effect social/political wealth
transfers
increased government subsidies must lead to compensatory
decreases in ex post payments for government subsidy
categories
Conflict: insurance wealth transfer objectives and
social/political wealth transfer objectives
neither achieved, or one ‘crowds out’ other
implications for efficiency, equity
INSURANCE CONSEQUENCES (I)
Selective increase in subsidies
increase in moral hazard in subsidised group only
Insurance response
increase ex post premiums only to the newly-subsidised
Regulatory response
ex post payments for newly-subsidised must directly reflect
increases in subsidies
Insurance response to regulatory response
spread additional moral hazard costs across all individuals
ex post premiums rise, even for those not receiving increased
subsidies
INSURANCE CONSEQUENCES (II)
Efficiency outcome
prices rise for low-subsidised
consumption falls below optimum => lower welfare
prices to higher-subsidised less than optimal given increase in
moral hazard risk => lower welfare
Equity outcome
extra costs arising from lower welfare collected only from ill
ex post collection becomes a consumption ‘tax on falling sick’
perfectly risk-rated ex post premium contribution
wealth transfer from the low-subsidised sick to the high-
subsidised sick
wealth transfer from the sick to the well
Contrary to efficiency raising objectives of
insurance instruments
EVIDENCE
Prices rising for all categories of patients
higher charges in practices receiving lower subsidies, even for
patients of same subsidy class (Consumer, 2005 Survey)
Patient charges not reflecting increases in
subsidies  (King, 2004: Cabinet paper)
Introduction of Care Plus after less than 2 years
targeted at the chronically ill
acknowledgement that the burden of the system design
outcomes falls most heavily on the frequently ill?
SERVICE DELIVERY CONSEQUENCES
Retention of practitioner charging right
removes ability for PHOs to strike efficient incentive contracts
with service providers
“If you can’t manage the risk, don’t bear it”
‘passing on’ capitation contracts to service providers
Service providers become insurers
inefficiently small – 1200-2000 patients
risk management costs rise
first recourse to manage => pass on to consumers in higher
prices (replicating pre NZPHCS risk-free provider status)
incentives for adverse selection (screening) increase
Welfare reduces further (relative to pre-NZPHCS,
efficient insurance market)
PROVIDERS AS INSURERS
COMPETITIVE RESTRICTIONS
Unlikely to see evolution to more efficient model
Provider-governors mandatory in PHOs
formed around existing provider groups
conflict of interest – on both sides of the ‘passing on’ contracts
unlikely to be party to contracts to restrict their practitioner
charging autonomy
Patients ‘locked in’
Government subsidies non-transferrable; payable only to PHOs
patients don’t face full cost of service delivery => less
competition from unsubsidised providers
Providers may also be ‘locked in’ to PHOs
local geographic monopolies; strong network effects
CONCLUSIONS
NZPHCS does not appear to be a centrally-planned
iteration towards a more efficient system
Rather, appears to be a consequence of an attempt
to use health care system institutional design to
‘fix’ a perceived problem on the health care
service delivery side
With disastrous consequences for the efficiency of
the entire system
Restructuring of the primary health care sector in
NZ “has put obstacles in its own path”
